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Abstract
Trilogues have become ‘normal’ structures in European Union (EU) decision-making but their functioning, based on se-
cluded decision-making, makes it difficult to understand how institutional positions are formed and managed and which
actors are better positioned to influence policy outputs. These are, however, important questions because, first, a coherent
position in trilogues (one that withstands the scrutiny of the Council) enhances the European Parliament’s (EP) chances of
achieving a favourable outcome following negotiation; second, because it has becomemore complicated to find a common
position within the EP due to increased levels of politicisation and polarisation (especially in the form of Euroscepticism) in
EU policy-making. Therefore, this article focuses on preparatory bodies preceding trilogues and the role they play in build-
ing Parliament’s positions. With the shift of political conflict from plenary to committees and now to shadows meetings,
the latter have become de facto decision-making bodies. Not only do they serve to mediate intra-institutional conflict but
also to anticipate Council and Commission positions. This article compares the use of shadows meetings in politicised and
non-politicised issues. With the use of ethnographic data provided by participant observation and elite interviews, we aim
to provide explanations on how these new instruments serve to informally manage politicisation, focusing in particular on
the advantages of insularity in highly publicised negotiations.
Keywords
committees; Common European Asylum System; European Parliament; European Union political parties; politicisation;
shadows meetings; trilogues
Issue
This article is part of the issue “Out of the Shadows, Into the Limelight: Parliaments and Politicisation”, edited by Christine
Neuhold (Maastricht University, The Netherlands) and Guri Rosén (University of Oslo, Norway).
© 2019 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
Trilogues have become ‘normal’ structures in EU
decision-making; however, they are informal negotia-
tions between representatives of Parliament, Council
and Commission with no reference in the treaties.
The aim of trilogues is to facilitate compromises on
legislative proposals before the first or second read-
ing in Parliament. On the political level, Parliament
is represented by the rapporteur and shadow rap-
porteurs; Council by the ambassador of its current
Presidency; and the Commission by a Director-General
or a Commissioner. Political trilogues are prepared by
technical meetings including, for example, Commission
policy officers, MEP assistants and administrative offi-
cials (see for example Ripoll Servent & Panning, 2019;
Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood, 2015, 2017). Given
that trilogues are based on secluded decision-making,
it is often difficult to understand how institutional po-
sitions are formed and managed and which actors are
better positioned to influence policy outputs. These are,
however, important questions because: first, a coherent
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position in trilogues (one that withstands the scrutiny
of the Council) enhances the European Parliament’s (EP)
chances of achieving a favourable outcome following
negotiation; second, because finding a common posi-
tion within the EP has become more complicated with
increased levels of politicisation and polarisation (espe-
cially in the form of Euroscepticism) in EU policy-making
(Ripoll Servent, 2018; Ripoll Servent & Panning, 2019).
The rise in fringe political parties has also put a strain on
the process of (informal) institutionalisation which has
over time successfully reduced politicisation and inter-
party conflict within the EP (Daniel, 2015; Rittberger,
2005; Salvati, 2016).
In view of these shifts, we aim to understand how
politicisation is managed in EP committees with a fo-
cus on those actors involved in trilogue negotiations
(relais actors). The latter are under particular pressure
to overcome conflicts and find strong compromises
that hold when facing Council and Commission in inter-
institutional talks. To this effect, we focus on the way re-
lais actors make use of informal preparatory bodies to
find consensus and build Parliament’s position. In the EP,
preparatory work takes place mostly in so-called ‘shad-
owsmeetings’, gathering the rapporteur and shadow rap-
porteurs, who are part of the EP’s negotiating team in tri-
logues. In addition, other ancillary actors such as political
advisors, assistants, and EP staff are also there to support
MEPs. We argue that these bodies have become a better
field of conflict management than plenary and commit-
tees, since they allow relais actors to hold discussions in a
more informal and flexible way, thereby anticipating the
positions of Council and Commission and adapting the
EP’s position during trilogue negotiations. Preparatory
bodies have been somewhat overlooked in the literature,
even though they have become key fora in which insti-
tutional actors form their positions and mediate the in-
creased polarisation and politicisation within and across
EU institutions. It is, therefore, important to understand
their function in order to establish under which condi-
tions they help or hinder conflictmanagementwithin leg-
islative committees.
Yet, not all issues are politicised nor do they provoke
the same level of conflict between EP groups. Therefore,
we argue that the more an issue becomes (or has the po-
tential to become) politicised, the more likely to see re-
lais actors making active use of ‘shadows meetings’ as
instruments of conflict management inside EP commit-
tees. To this effect, the article uses ethnographic data
provided by participant observation and elite interviews
(see the list in the Annex) in order to explore the effects
that politicisation has on EP preparations for (and during)
trilogues. We compare two legislative negotiations (revi-
sion of the statute and funding of EU political parties and
foundations [EUPP] and asylum package) to examine the
differential effects of (non-)politicisation on the use of
shadows meetings and the extent to which these have
been actively used by relais actors to diffuse conflict and
pre-empt future division. This comparison allows us also
to draw patterns of participation in shadows meetings,
focusing in particular on the dynamics between main-
stream and fringe MEPs.
The first section of the article explores the links be-
tween parliamentary coordination instruments aimed at
building consensus and the impact that politicisation
may have on them. From this, we develop expectations
on how the presence or absence of politicisation affects
the consensus-building strategies of relais actors when
building an EP position within committees and present
our methodology. The second part explains the use of
shadows meetings in general and explores the impact
of politicisation by comparing a case of no politicisation
(EUPP)with a case of politicisation (asylumpackage). The
comparison of the two cases leads us then to the conclu-
sion that politicisation does indeed stress the need for
seclusion and tends to undermine transparency and the
deliberative nature of committees.
2. Politicisation in Legislative Committees
Despite politicisation now being a widespread phe-
nomenon, most of the literature has focused on the
impact it may have on public opinion and party sys-
tems (e.g., De Wilde, Leupold, & Schmidtke, 2016, and
related special issue; Hutter, Grande, & Kriesi., 2016).
We know much less about the impact of politicisation
on legislatures and, in particular, legislative committees.
Politicisation might not be particularly problematic for
plenary, given that the latter’s purpose is to act as a
public tribune and, therefore, expose ideological con-
flicts (Slapin & Proksch, 2010). In contrast, politicisation
is inimical to legislative committees, whose goal is to
build consensus. Indeed, committees share the neces-
sary conditions for consensus practices to emerge: first,
they tend to be insulated from public scrutiny and are,
therefore, under less (electoral) pressure when holding
debates and finding compromises; second, most legisla-
tive committees (and particularly those in the EP) tend
to specialise and gather expert members familiar with
the technical aspects of their policy field(s); finally, com-
mittees are sites where members can nurture their rela-
tionships over long periods of time, which facilitates the
emergence of an esprit de corps and reciprocity (Sartori,
1987, Chapter 8). These three conditions are particularly
relevant to understand EP legislative committees since
they are in charge of formulating a mandate for inter-
institutional negotiations (i.e., presenting a report that
amends the Commission’s proposal). Therefore, commit-
tees are the loci of internal EP negotiations and in charge
of managing inter-party conflicts (Bowler & Farrell, 1995;
Whitaker, 2011; Yordanova, 2013).
Certainly, in normal circumstances, there are environ-
mental aspects that might affect the capacity of commit-
tees to act as consensus-builders. First, we know that
the institutional conditions leading to consensus are par-
ticularly effective with less controversial (policy) issues
(Miller & Stecker, 2008). The lack of controversy under-
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scores these latent institutional conditions and allows
them to reach their full potential. On the contrary, if is-
sues become controversial, it is more likely that the work
of committees will become more publicised and be ex-
posed to increased external scrutiny. Second, the insu-
lated nature of legislative committees has raised aware-
ness about the trade-off between efficiency and democ-
racy. This has been at the core of criticism in many par-
liaments, including the EP (Brandsma, 2019; Reh, 2014).
As a result, many parliamentary committees have under-
gone what Fasone and Lupo (2015) refer to as ‘forced
increased transparency’. Calls for more democracy and
accountability in committees has led to the introduc-
tion of new rules forcing transparency—for instance by
transmitting committee debates online, publishing agen-
das and minutes, or giving plenary more oversight pow-
ers (Brandsma, 2019; Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood,
2017). The result of increased transparency has been a
decrease in their powers and a shift to other decision-
making bodies characterised by high informality and
opacity (Fasone & Lupo, 2015).
How might politicisation affect the powers and roles
of legislative committees and their capacity to build
consensus? If we follow De Wilde et al. (2016, p. 4),
politicisation can be defined as ‘(a) the growing salience
of European governance, involving (b) a polarisation of
opinion, and (c) an expansion of actors and audiences
engaged in monitoring EU affairs’. Therefore, politicisa-
tion leads to more contestation and polarisation in EU
policy-making, particularly when issues are related to
the nature and future of European integration. As we
have seen, more contestation might potentially under-
mine the norms of consensus provided by the insulated
nature of committees. In addition, politicisation brings
with it more (public) scrutiny, which generally leads to
calls for transparency and openness.
In order to assess the effects of politicisation and
their link to parliamentary coordination instruments, we
first examine to what extent an issue has become politi-
cised in EU policy-making and the EP in particular. To this
effect, we assess whether the issue is: 1) salient (look-
ing for instance at the attention it received inside and
outside Parliament); 2) polarising—especially in terms
of EU integration; and 3) the focus of external atten-
tion leading to the involvement of actors beyond the
EP. Once we have established the level of politicisation
of a given issue, we explore the linkage between the
presence/absence of politicisation and the use of coor-
dination instruments to build the position of Parliament
before trilogues. To this effect, we draw four potential
paths leading to different uses of ‘shadows meetings’
(see Table 1).
The first (technical) path takes place in cases where
none of the characteristics of politicisation are present.
Given the technical nature of the issues at stake, we
would expect the necessary conditions for consensus
practices to be there—namely, expert MEPs who have
regularly worked together and who are able to negoti-
ate in a relatively insulated setting. Therefore, ‘shadows
meetings’ might only be necessary to deal with technical
discussions and would not act as an instrument to man-
age conflict. In the second path, we expect issues to be
seen as ‘political’. This opens a window for saliency to
become an issue in internal negotiations—either by rais-
ing the stakes within the EP or by attracting external at-
tention. However, these issues are not perceived as po-
larising in nature—especially when it comes to the EU
integration dimension. In this case, we would expect EP
party groups to nominate loyal members as rapporteurs
or shadow rapporteurs (Hurka, Kaeding, & Obholzer,
2015). Internal EP negotiationswould thenbe focusedon
achieving aminimal-winning coalition to support the EP’s
mandate before trilogues. Therefore, ‘shadows meet-
ings’ might be less relevant to reaching an EP position
than bilateral contacts among EP groups; given that gen-
erally a grand coalition between the European People’s
Party (EPP) and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and
Democrats (S&D) is needed to reach a majority, nego-
tiations will focus on the dynamics between the larger
groups (Hix & Høyland, 2013).
Table 1. Paths leading to an EP position before trilogues.
External Type of relais Use of shadows
Salience Polarisation attention actors Coalition logic meetings
Non-politicised issues
Technical path No No No Experts Consensus-seeking Mostly at technical level
Political path Yes No Depends Party soldiers Minimal-winning Few; focus of
coalition negotiations on larger
groups
Politicised issues
Control path Yes Yes Yes Party soldiers Oversized majority Few; political
coordinators in control
Informality path Yes Yes Yes Experts Oversized majority High number and main
focus of negotiations
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In highly politicised issues, we can expect negotia-
tions to be particularly difficult and to raise the atten-
tion of outside actors such as domestic governments
and media, voters and interest representatives. The EP
would also expect it to be a more difficult issue to ne-
gotiate with the Council since the latter tends to be less
pro-integration than Parliament (Kreppel & Hix, 2003,
p. 81). Therefore, EP relais actors have a stake in reach-
ing oversized majorities that give them room for ma-
noeuvre and legitimacy when going into trilogues; the
more the EP can unite behind a common position, the
greater the chance of success when negotiating with
Council (Trauner & Ripoll Servent, 2016). However, we
could imagine legislative committees to handle the pres-
sure of politicisation differently. On the one hand (con-
trol path), if an issue is highly contentious, they might
prefer to appoint rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs
who are close to their political parties, in order to ensure
that they represent the political views of the majority in
committee and plenary (Hurka et al., 2015). In addition,
committee coordinators might be afraid that delegating
negotiations to a small informal groupmight lead to ama-
jority that unravels when it comes to voting in committee
and/or plenary. Therefore, they might want to limit the
use of shadows meetings in order to keep control over
negotiations. On the other hand (informality path), if is-
sues become highly politicised and receive a lot of exter-
nal attention, EP relais might prefer to shift the venue of
negotiations to a more informal setting to avoid scrutiny
and re-create the conditions for consensus-seeking that
normally exist in committees. Here, we would expect po-
litical groups to nominate MEPs who are perceived as
experts in terms of both substance and procedure; this
might facilitate the emergence of trust in a highly po-
larised setting. In this case, the dynamics between re-
lais actors (especially between those belonging to main-
stream and non-mainstream groups) might be crucial for
the success of internal negotiations (Häge & Ringe, 2019;
Judge & Earnshaw, 2011).
3. Methodology
The data are derived from qualitative interviews with
actors in Parliament and Council conducted between
March 2017 and March 2019 as well as from observa-
tions from a seven-month field-research stay in Brussels
(October 2017–April 2018). Interviews were mostly con-
ducted in Brussels and in rare cases via telephone. For
the case studies, all rapporteurs and shadow rappor-
teurs, the involved policy advisors from the party groups
and, if the contact was available, officials from the com-
mittee secretariats were contacted via email. In addi-
tion, we also carried out general interviews on shadows
meetings with informants who had worked on many re-
ports or who were recommended by other interviewees
and contacts formed during the field research. While at
least one actor from most party groups agreed to an in-
terview, European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR),
UK Independence Party–Europe of Freedom and Direct
Democracy (UKIP-EFDD) and nearly all Europe of Nations
and Freedom (ENF) actors either did not respond to or
declined the interview request. In addition, it was more
difficult to interview actors from smaller party groups,
since they have a higher workload and fewer personnel.
Interviewees were asked about the organisation and the
conduct of shadows meetings, differences between big
and small, Eurosceptic and pro-European party groups as
well as other informal arrangements outside of themeet-
ings. Interviews with actors involved in the case studies
were asked the same questions, however with a focus
on how shadows meetings played out in their particu-
lar case. The field research stay was divided into two
parts—five months in the Commission and two months
in Parliament. The focus lay on participant observation
of trilogues and preparatory meetings. The focus of the
participant observation was not so much on the con-
tent of individual policies but rather on the relation-
ship between participants. The aim was to understand
how meetings were organised, how participants inter-
acted and how conflicts were solved. Thus, the observa-
tion helped to form a general understanding of shadows
meetings and internal dynamics, which facilitated and
informed the conduct of interviews and provided back-
ground information for our research.
As for case selection, the two files were selected be-
cause they varied in our main explanatory factor (politi-
cisation). While the EUPP file was very salient for the po-
litical actors inside Parliament, the topic received little
external attention outside the trilogue circle. In addition,
there was very little polarisation between the different
party groups as they all had the same goal: to secure and
facilitate funding for their political parties. The asylum
package, on the other hand, was not only highly salient
inside the EP but had also attracted large attention out-
side the EU institutions as a result of the so-called ‘mi-
gration crisis’ of 2015–2016. Furthermore, the issue split
party groups along deep ideological lines, complicating
coalition-formation and consensus-seeking.
It is, therefore, interesting to compare how two files,
which were very salient for parliamentary actors, were
affected differently by the presence or absence of politi-
cisation. Such a comparison can help us understand how
files are handled and negotiated in the EP and how politi-
cisation can influence this process.
4. Shifting Decisions to ‘Shadows Meetings’
Under the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision),
a legislative initiative from the Commission is referred
to the committee in Parliament responsible for negoti-
ations; the latter then writes a committee report amend-
ing the Commission’s proposal. In accordance with the
EP’s Rules of Procedure, each legislative proposal is re-
ferred to a committee, which then appoints a rapporteur
responsible for writing the report (EP, 2019, Rules 47 and
49). It is only after the adoption of the report by the com-
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mittee that the EP can decide to enter into trilogue ne-
gotiations (EP, 2019, Rule 69c). To facilitate their work
on the report, rapporteurs invite all shadow rapporteurs
appointed for a file (EP, 2019, Rule 205a) to so-called
shadowsmeetings, where they discuss amendments pro-
posed by the political groups (EP, 2014b). This informal
instrument serves to coordinate positions and facilitates
finding a compromise supported by a majority of—or at
best all—EP representatives so that Parliament projects
a united appearance in trilogue negotiations (EP, 2014b;
Ripoll Servent, 2018; Ripoll Servent & Panning, 2019).
The importance of shadows meetings as fora for man-
aging intra-institutional contestation and finding com-
promise increased considerably following the Treaty of
Lisbon (Interview 6).While beforehand, consultation and
compromise between groups happened rather sponta-
neously, nowadays an improved structure supports the
organisation of the EP delegation and its preparation
for trilogues (Interviews 3, 4, 7). The committee stage
remains important because it is there that the com-
promise brokered in shadows meetings is voted upon
(Interview 1, 2). The files are also debated in committee
to increase public visibility and to keep other commit-
teemembers regularly briefed (Interview 6). At the same
time, shadows meetings provide a secluded forum that
helps balance party group interests outside of the pub-
lic limelight; therefore, they allow for compromises that
would not have been possible had negotiations been
held in public committee sessions (Interviews 5, 6, 8).
Rapporteurs—supported in their work by assistants,
policy advisors from their party group, the committee
secretariat, and the EP’s Legal Service—chair shadows
meetings (Interview 1, 5). Shadows are also supported by
the staff of their group (Interview 8) but, while the rap-
porteur as the chair is always present in shadows meet-
ings, shadows can choose whether to attend or be rep-
resented by an assistant or a political advisor from their
group. Shadows regularly report back to their group to
ensure that they are on the same page (Interview 15, 16),
which is especially important when it comes to finding
majorities in committee and plenary votes (Interviews 8,
12, 22; Häge & Ringe, 2019; Judge & Earnshaw, 2011).
The meetings can be divided into shadows meetings
before the committee vote and shadows meetings dur-
ing the trilogue negotiation phase. While they are part
of the same process and have the same composition,
they serve different purposes (Interviews 5, 6, 9, 11, 12).
Shadows meetings before the committee vote help the
rapporteur and shadows forge a compromise to act as
Parliament’s common negotiating position. In the meet-
ings, the rapporteurs present their amendments, which
are usually circulated in advance, and every shadow (or
the person representing the shadow) is given the op-
portunity to react, signal agreement, ask questions, or
suggest their own amendments (Interview 5, 6, 7, 17,
18); the speaking order is allocated according to group
size (Interview 10). In general, shadows send their as-
sistants if they agree with the rapporteur’s work, only
want to suggest small changes, or if the file is of lesser
importance to their group (Interview 12, 13, own obser-
vation). If they want major changes or have important
amendments, attending themselves gives greater weight
to their demands. Joining shadowsmeetingsmight prove
crucial to smaller party groups: Those who engage ac-
tively in the discussions and make their voices heard of-
ten get amendments that are relevant to them, as long
as they do not contradict the largest groups’ interests
(Interview 11, 12, 15, 17; Häge & Ringe, 2019). Thus—
despite being in the minority—they might manage to
shift the compromise and bring it closer to their position.
This dynamic is accentuated by the composition
of shadows meetings: since each party group is only
represented by one shadow (or their respective assis-
tant/political advisor), the size of the group matters less
than in committee; the end result might depend rather
on personality, persuasion, or group dynamics during the
meetings (Interviews 7, 9, 11, 12; Häge & Ringe, 2019).
While every group is given the floor in shadowsmeetings,
the rapporteur generally has consulted the other party
groups prior to the meeting. These pre-consultations
serve to actively involve EPP and/or S&D as the two
largest groups since at least one of them is needed to en-
sure the success of the final compromise when it goes to
a vote in committee (Interview 12, 13, 14). Since plenary
has to implicitly or explicitly confirm the trilogue man-
date (EP, 2019, Rule 69c), a compromise supported by a
small majority risks losing the vote because of defectors
from their own party group. This is not unlikely during
plenary votes as, outside of shadows meetings and com-
mittee sessions, both expert and non-expert MEPs are
involved in the vote and might follow other logics of vot-
ing behaviour compared to committee members (Faas,
2003; Ringe, 2010). Thus, rapporteurs have an incentive
to forge a broad majority, involving as many shadows as
possible (Interview 5).
In comparison, shadows meetings during trilogues
are primarily used for finding common strategies to de-
fend Parliament’s position in trilogues or to discuss the
trilogue agenda (Interviews 3, 5, 9). The role of shadows
is to ensure that the rapporteur represents the agreed
compromise (Interview 6) and includes the points impor-
tant to their political group (Interview 9, 11).
In sum, although legislative committees are formally
in charge, most negotiating work is carried out in shad-
ows meetings; ‘the bread and butter of parliamentary
work’ (Interview 6).
5. Comparing ‘Shadows Meetings’ across Policy Issues
5.1. Revision of the Statute and Funding of EUPP
The first regulation governing political parties at
European level and the rules regarding their funding
entered into force in February 2004 (EP & Council of
the European Union, 2003). For the first time, it enti-
tled European political parties to receive funding from
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the EU’s budget (Ripoll Servent, 2018, Chapter 9). The
organisation of EUPPs, however, still depended on
the national laws of the member state in which a po-
litical party was based—a situation seen critically by
Parliament (European Parliamentary Research Service,
2018). As a result, the EP (2006, 2011) called twice on
the Commission to revise the existing regulation. In
2014, a new regulation (EP & Council of the European
Union, 2014) gave EUPPs and foundations a European le-
gal personality and introduced more flexibility in their
funding, thereby increasing their visibility and effec-
tiveness. In 2016, Parliament revived the topic: A let-
ter from the EPP, the S&D, and the Alliance of Liberals
and Democrats for Europe group (ALDE) asked the
Commission to revise the Regulation and a report from
the EP’s Secretary-General examined the funding of
EUPPs and their foundations. This report was exten-
sively discussed in the EP Committee on Constitutional
Affairs (AFCO), resulting in January 2017 in a parlia-
mentary question for oral answer to the Commission
(European Parliamentary Research Service, 2018). The
question called on the Commission to address MEPs’
questions and to present a new legislative proposal ad-
dressing suggestions fromParliament (EP, 2017a). During
a plenary debate in March 2017, the Commission con-
firmed a formal review in 2018 that would accommodate
Parliament’s main concerns (European Parliamentary
Research Service, 2018). Despite this announcement, in
June 2017 Parliament adopted another resolution en-
couraging the Commission ‘to propose a revision of the
regulation as soon as possible’ (EP, 2017b). In view of this
resolution, Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker
(2017) announced a new proposal on EUPPs and foun-
dations in his State of the Union speech in September
2017. The AFCO nominated two co-rapporteurs, Rainer
Wieland (EPP) and Mercedes Bresso (S&D), who pre-
sented their draft report on 23 October 2017 (AFCO,
2017a). The amended report was discussed and adopted
a month later; along with the vote on the report, the
committee decided to enter into trilogue negotiations
(AFCO, 2017b). The day before the only trilogue took
place in February 2018, the co-rapporteurs briefed AFCO
on the progress of inter-institutional negotiations. On 23
March 2018, AFCO adopted the provisional agreement
from trilogue negotiations with only one abstention and
one vote against it (AFCO, 2018). The text was adopted
at the end of April and entered into force in May 2018
(EP & Council of the European Union, 2018). The long
history of the file and Parliament’s persistence on its revi-
sions show that the EUPP file was very important for the
political groups in the EP. It was highly salient because it
directly concerned all political groups in Parliament since
they are all members of (at least) one European political
party (for a list, see Ripoll Servent, 2018, pp. 206–207).
Although co-rapporteurships are common in AFCO
(Interview 21), in this case, the nomination of co-
rapporteurs from the two biggest party groups was
meant to send a political signal to the Council and
Commission. It served to demonstrate, on the one hand,
the importance of the file for the EP and, on the
other, that the EPP and S&D were united on this issue,
which put Parliament in a better position during inter-
institutional negotiations (Interviews 19, 20). In general,
the decision to appoint two rapporteurs gave the largest
groups a chance to exchange views and consult with
each other (Interview 19) and, thereby, share the pres-
sure exerted by other actors. Indeed, the internal EP
process was rapid with less than two months between
the nomination of the co-rapporteurs and the adoption
of their report in AFCO. This means that only a lim-
ited number of shadows meetings could be organised,
which strengthened the focus of the negotiations on
the larger groups. Indeed, the presence of two rappor-
teurs from the largest groups created some difficulties:
The EPP and S&D did not always share the same po-
sition on all issues and had different priorities, which
led to some disagreements and discussions between the
co-rapporteurs during the preparation of their draft re-
port (Interview 20). This dynamic made it difficult for
the smaller groups to have a say in the discussions, es-
pecially on points that were already difficult between
the co-rapporteurs (Interview 21). Therefore, shadows
from smaller groups were only able to make a differ-
ence in ancillary issues (Interview 19). For instance, ALDE
and the Greens pushed to have an obligation for parties
to publish information on their website regarding the
gender composition of candidate lists and members of
European political parties (Interview 18, AFCO, 2017c).
The co-rapporteurs accepted their amendments and gen-
der representation was eventually included in the EP
mandate. This strategy is not unusual; even if a broadma-
jority has already been secured, rapporteurs try to incor-
porate as many amendments from other groups as pos-
sible in the compromise because it will ensure a positive
vote in committee and thereby strengthen the EP’s posi-
tion in trilogues (Interviews 5, 6, 8, 10). In this case, this
proved right: Although gender was not a priority for the
co-rapporteurs (Interviews 18, 21), it ensured the sup-
port of ALDE and the Greens, which led to a broad ma-
jority in committee.
The vote on the draft report in the AFCO commit-
tee shows that the report was supported by all pro-
European party groups. The ECR and ENF shadows ab-
stained, one ECR MEP voted against it, and no mem-
ber of the EFDD group was present during the vote (EP,
2017c). Hard Eurosceptic groups often abstain from shad-
owsmeetings, either because they refuse to engagewith
the day-to-day political work in parliament or because
mainstream party groups exclude them through a cor-
don sanitaire (Ripoll Servent & Panning, 2019). However,
all party groups had an interest in this file, as it was
about securing financial funding for their European polit-
ical parties. Indeed, right-wing Eurosceptics were afraid
that the proposal would be used to disadvantage them in
the upcoming elections in 2019 (Interview16). Therefore,
they did try to get involved and—as is the case for all
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 3, Pages 303–315 308
participating parties in shadows meetings—were free
to take the floor and present their views (Interview 15,
16, 18). However, the tacit use of the cordon sanitaire
made it difficult for them to participate; although they
had good insights that might have helped to improve the
proposal, the other actors did not listen to their points
(Interview 16). On the contrary, mainstream participants
were cautious because they had the impression that
hard Eurosceptics were only interested in securing fund-
ing (Interview 18). Although the Greens and Confederal
Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left
(GUE/NGL) also disagreed with the Commission’s pro-
posal (Interviews 15, 16, 22), the overall conflict did
not revolve around the nature of European integration,
which prevented a strong polarisation along this dimen-
sion and helped groups concentrate on a common goal:
ensuring that the reform of the statute was successful in
inter-institutional negotiations.
This lack of polarisation might explain why the pro-
posal raised little interest beyond the small circle of rap-
porteurs and shadows. Indeed, shadows meetings were
less relevant than in other occasions; they were helpful
to incorporate concerns from the smaller party groups
rather than acting as a space to broker compromises.
Party groups which disagreed fundamentally with the
regulation were listened to but excluded from the larger
agreement, which was ultimately secured via a compro-
mise drafted between the co-rapporteurs from the EPP
and S&Dwith the support of smaller, pro-European party
groups. The EUPP file was, thus, a non-politicised issue
following a political path: despite its internal salience,
the positions of the political groups were not polarised
along issues of European integration, which meant that
negotiations received little external attention. Therefore,
the focus of negotiations focused on the two largest
parties, which were key to ensuring the success of the
file. It is interesting to see, however, that despite having
achieved a bipartisan agreement that warranted them a
minimal-winning coalition, they still used shadows meet-
ings to enlarge this support by incorporating some ancil-
lary points that were relevant to smaller parties.
5.2. The Revision of the Common European Asylum
System (CEAS)
The reform of the EU’s asylum system was among the
most contested legislative packages in the 2014–2019
legislature—especially since itsmain cause (the so-called
‘migrant crisis’) occupied headlines across the EU for
most of those five years (Lavenex, 2018; Trauner, 2016).
The issue of migration had held the attention of the EP
since autumn 2014, when a series of debates and own-
initiative reports underlined the need to tackle the ar-
rival and death of migrants in the Mediterranean; their
propensity raised as the number of migrants increased
and member states started to discuss potential solu-
tions to address the crisis (e.g., EP, 2014a, 2015a, 2015b,
2015c, 2016). The EP debates served as a counterpoint
to the increasingly central role played by the European
Council and were often the only chance for Parliament
to voice its opinion on these matters. Indeed, the EP was
sidelined from the decision on relocation quotas in June
and September 2015 (Zaun, 2018) and the EU–Turkey
Agreement of March 2016 (Slominski & Trauner, 2018).
This changed when the Commission decided to issue
two sets of legislative proposals aimed at reforming the
core of the EU’s asylum system; notably, it included a
reform of the Dublin Regulation, which establishes the
state responsible for asylum applications, and four ancil-
lary texts making up the CEAS—namely the Procedures
Regulation (aiming to harmonise common rules for
dealing with asylum applications), the Qualifications
Regulation (who can receive international protection),
the Receptions Directive (how asylum-seekers should
be treated in member states) and Eurodac (fingerprint-
ing database). The Commission added new proposals on
Resettlement (bringing people in need of international
protection to the EU) and an upgrade of the European
Asylum Support Office into an asylum agency. The EP
managed to form a united position in all the files, which
(except for Dublin and Procedures) progressed into tri-
logues and eventually led to political agreements with
the Council. However, the inability of Council to find
an agreement on Dublin led to a generalised deadlock
and the package was deemed to have failed before
the EP elections of May 2019 (Interviews 31, 32, 33).
The inability to find an agreement reflected the increas-
ingly polarised positions on immigration in many mem-
ber states and the impact it had on domestic elections
and shifting party systems (for more details on inter-
institutional negotiations and the reasons for failure, see
Ripoll Servent, 2019).
Therefore, we can consider the asylum package to
have been highly politicised: it was perceived as an ex-
tremely salient and urgent issue; it centred on conflicts
around notions of European integration and solidarity
among member states; and it attracted an enormous
amount of attention from national media, citizens, civil
society, and third countries. This led to well-defined
cleavages inside the EP, which was divided also along a
clear ideological line—with the right to the centre em-
phasising issues of border security, while the left-wing
groups focused on migrant rights (Interviews 26, 27,
30). Finding consensus inside Parliament was seen as a
challenge by most groups, but the urgency of the mat-
ter and the need to adopt a united front vis-à-vis the
Council acted as catalysts inside the civil liberties com-
mittee (Interview 24). In order to achieve this united
front, shadows meetings became a crucial instrument
to find compromises. Their role was particularly impor-
tant given the ‘packaged’ nature of these files, which in-
creased the need for coordination across different ne-
gotiation teams. This task was rendered more challeng-
ing because the files did not always share rapporteurs
and shadow rapporteurs (as had been the case in the
previous CEAS reform of 2011/2013). Therefore, shad-
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ows meetings were often the place in which to deal with
the (technical) overlaps across the files—notably on how
to define family members (Interview 31). These shad-
ows meetings gathered mostly staff of the MEPs or their
political groups, rather than the MEPs themselves. In
general, the files were so complex and politically sensi-
tive, that rapporteurs tended to organise more shadows
meetings than usual. For instance, one interviewee re-
ported that, for Dublin, they ‘needed 21 to 22, depend-
ing on how you count, negotiations rounds. Usually, you
have 4 or 5’ (Interview 24; Interview 25 reported 27 shad-
ows meetings).
The EP’s position across the ‘asylum package’ was
highly influenced by dynamics inside the negotiation
teams and the ability of rapporteurs and shadows to
manage conflicts in shadows meetings. While the team
working on an asylum agency was formed of highly ex-
perienced legislators who all worked well together, find-
ing compromises on other files was more difficult. For
instance, the ECR rapporteur working on Eurodac was
against the CEAS reform and, therefore, refused to co-
operate with other rapporteurs or with her own shad-
ows. In other dossiers, the presence or absence of cer-
tain shadows led to slightly biased positions. In the case
of Qualifications and Resettlement, the EPP was mostly
absent from shadows meetings, which resulted in more
left-wing reports (Interviews 27, 31). Finally, due to a
combination of factors, some of the most complicated
negotiations took place in the Procedures Regulation. It
was the last file to be negotiated in Parliament, which
meant that many outstanding issues (and grudges) had
to be dealt with there. In addition, the rapporteur was
an Italian MEP from the EFDD, who was not trusted to
do a good job as an EP negotiator—both as member of a
Eurosceptic political group and because she was largely
influenced by Italian politics. She also insisted on holding
shadows meetings in Italian (with interpretation), which
led to confusion and made it difficult for others to follow
the discussions. Therefore, the EPP and S&D made sure
that they found a compromise outside the meetings in
order to pass the file in committee (Interviews 23, 30).
In general, compromises in shadows meetings were
eventually found among mainstream groups (Inter-
view 31). The ENF was absent from most shadows meet-
ings as a matter of principle (Interviews 24, 28, 30, 33,
34). The EFDD was highly divided, with Italian MEPs try-
ing to participate in shadows meetings, despite know-
ing that the small size of its national delegation and
their political profile would give them little influence.
BritishMEPs (UKIP) weremostly absent, and the Swedish
shadow for some files (Winberg) simply opposed any
reform of the CEAS (Interviews 25, 29, 31). As for soft
Eurosceptic groups such as GUE/NGL and ECR, it de-
pended mostly on the shadow, with some highly active
and cooperative (for instance GUE/NGL in Qualifications
and ECR in Dublin), while others were mostly excluded
from any attempt to find consensus because their po-
sitions were too radical (Albiol [GUE/NGL] and, espe-
cially, Halla-Aho [ECR] in Procedures; Interviews 24,
25). This, of course, is a well-known strategy of these
groups, which participate in shadows meetings but pro-
pose extreme amendments, knowing that they will be
rejected by mainstream groups; it is a way to notify
their opposition and justify a negative vote in committee
(Interview 33).
Therefore, we have seen how, in a highly politicised
legislative package, shadows meetings were essential to
manage conflicts in the EP and to anticipate potential dis-
agreements with Council. At the same time, it also shows
how, despite the overlaps between the files and the need
to coordinate between negotiating teams, each proce-
dure was a world of its own. In this sense, the composi-
tion of the negotiating team was essential to guarantee
broader majorities and more effective shadows meet-
ings. In those files where rapporteur and shadows rap-
porteurs had worked together in the past or had more
experience dealing with asylum policies, coordination
(both political and technical) was more fruitful than in
shadows meetings held by extremeMEPs and/or inexpe-
rienced members. Therefore, in those cases where files
were dealt with by expert MEPs and fringe parties were
absent, therewas amore active use of shadowsmeetings
(informality path). In comparison, when fringe parties or
EuroscepticMEPs acted as rapporteurs, thereweremore
attempts by party groups tomake agreements outside of
shadows meetings (control path).
6. Conclusion
This article has presented a comparison of two salient yet
very different legislative files—especially when it comes
to the presence of politicisation. It shows how parlia-
mentary actors tried to actively find compromises on
these files in order to be more effective in trilogue nego-
tiations with the Council and Commission and how im-
portant shadows meetings were to finding a common
position inside the EP. The EUPP file, on the one hand,
was a highly political file for EP actors, as it revised fi-
nancial regulations for European political parties which
directly affected EP party groups. At the same time, it
raised fewer issues related to EU integration and little
attention from actors outside the EP. As a result, while
the nomination of two co-rapporteurs from S&D and
EPP demonstrated the file’s importance, it also helped to
keep the conflict within the two biggest groups—which
diminished the need for shadows meetings or the active
involvement of committee and plenary. In the end, the
co-rapporteurship system meant that the two biggest
groups only needed the smaller groups to secure a broad
parliamentary majority in order to prevent a major split
of Parliament along party lines and ideologies. As a re-
sult, the intra-institutional negotiation process followed
a political path that stressed the need for winning coali-
tions and put the onus on the two larger groups to find
an agreement between them; once this was achieved,
negotiations with other groups were relatively quick and
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uncontroversial. The asylum package, on the other hand,
split Parliament along left-right party lines. It also raised
questions about the nature of European integration and
the benefit of harmonising asylumpolicies further (Ripoll
Servant, 2019). The controversial, ideologically-charged
nature of the package complicated the process of find-
ing compromises, also in shadows meetings. In those
cases where rapporteur and shadow rapporteurs had ex-
perience in the field and had worked together in the
past, shadows meetings were used to gain large majori-
ties. Therefore, while shadows meetings were crucial
to ensure the support of the committee on all files by
gathering broad majorities inside and across negotiat-
ing teams, the ‘informality path’ was particularly impor-
tant under conditions of expertise and strong social ties
among members of the negotiating team.
What does this tell us about the use of shadows
meetings to formulate united positions within legislative
committees? First, it seems that the path of informality
that has led to secluded decision-making in the form of
inter-institutional trilogues (Farrell & Héritier, 2004; Reh,
2014) has also continued within the EP. We could, there-
fore, speak of a second layer of informalisationwhich has
now become largely institutionalised inside Parliament.
Second, the shift to informal decision-making within leg-
islative committees is particularly present in politicised
files. Indeed, politicisation heightens the need for new
negotiation fora away from the public limelight. It puts
pressure on relais actors to find broad winning coalitions
in a more polarised context (both on the left/right and
pro/anti-Europe dimensions), which helps to better un-
derstand why they make more intensive use of shad-
ows meetings. These conditions seem to apply partic-
ularly when the negotiating team is composed of ex-
pert mainstream MEPs. It will be important to examine
whether these conditions hold in the new parliamentary
term—where the presence of more fringe parties and
first-timers (two-thirds of MEPs were newly elected in
the 2019 elections) might strengthen polarisation and
weaken expertise as an essential element of the main-
stream groups’ political capital.
We see, therefore, a paradox emerging: The more
a file is politicised, the more it runs the risk of shifting
towards secluded arenas of decision-making and disem-
powering plenary and committees as fora for delibera-
tion. Seclusion is predominant whenmainstream parties
dominate negotiations and can ignore the presence of
Eurosceptic and fringe parties. Therefore, politicisation
stresses indeed the poisoned chalice of transparency
in legislative conflicts: More polarisation might call for
more transparency and open deliberation but, in real-
ity, it strengthens informality and seclusion. This, in turn,
may strengthen the claims of Eurosceptics, who accuse
the EP of being opaque and ignoring them. In a time
when debates become more polarised and the future of
European integration is under pressure, the shift towards
more seclusion in the form of informal shadows meet-
ings may reinforce the (perceived) democratic deficit of
the EU and widen the gap between European represen-
tatives and their voters.
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